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Abstract
Modern medical technology accords physicians the capacity to
prolong life and to protract the duration of numerous incurable diseases.
KEYWORDS: will, living, life
I I
In re Living Will
Modern medical technology accords physicians the capacity to
prolong life and to protract the duration of numerous incurable dis-
eases. However, the ability to sustain life transcends the ability to heal.
Lives which once would have expired now endure with organ trans-
plants, respirators, pacemakers, and hemodialysis machines. "Living
Wills"' have been created by lawyers to assist those who wish to avoid
mechanically extending their lives. Medical progress, it seems, some-
times creates unforeseen and undesirable consequences.'
People envision the horror of being maintained in an unconscious,
non-human limbo in a refrigerated room containing only machines.
This state is in stark contradiction to the usual idea of death as a brief,
but peaceful end. We envision physicians preparing to dissect an organ
for transplant from a body whose brain is dead but whose heart is still
beating. We also envision a patient having been attached to a respirator
for so long that he has developed "respirator brain" - a condition
where the brain becomes softened or liquified8 - destroying pathologi-
cal indications of brain injury and preventing a determination of the
cause of death.4 Such horrors exist within hospital walls daily, creating
confusion and fear among physicians and hospitals in determining
whether to withhold or withdraw life-supporting treatment. Since In re
1. A "living will" is a document, similar to a will, executed by a person during
his lifetime setting forth his wishes concerning medical treatment in contemplation of
illness or death.
2. See Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the Quin-
lan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304 (1977). See also Walker, Diamond & Moseley,
The Neuropathologic Findings in Irreversible Coma, 34 J. NEUROPATHOLOGY AND
EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 295 (1976).
3. Walker, Diamond & Moseley, supra note 2; Wright & Ostrow, The Role of
the Medical Examiner in Determining Time of Death in Brain Dead Patients, 67 J.
FLA. MED. A. 134 (1980).
4. See In re Cain, 44 Fla. Supp. 208 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. 1976) (the continuation
of medical procedures would preclude any possibility of obtaining an effective examina-
tion of the deceased woman's brain tissue because such tissue was constantly
deteriorating).
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Quinlan, the issues of "euthanasia '' 5 and "the right to die"' have gen-
erated controversy in both the medical and legal professions.7 Reevalu-
ation of the physician's responsibilities to the dying patient has revolved
around whether the physician should permit the terminally ill individ-
ual to refuse life-supporting treatment or whether he should subse-
quently withhold or withdraw such treatment. These dilemmas have
created a recent flood of interest in the "living will" and in natural
death legislation.8 As a result, many patients questioning the value of
prolonging life at the expense of diminishing its quality, are refusing
life-supporting treatment, crying "death with dignity."
This right to die by refusing extraordinary treatment has emerged
from the recent availability of an alternative to life or death - to be
kept "alive" in a limbo state by life-supporting measures. If given the
opportunity, a person must be permitted to choose from these alterna-
tives. To many, to die peacefully is a much more attractive alternative
than to die with tubes down one's throat and in one's arms.9 To prolong
life at the expense of the loss of bodily functions and intense pain and
suffering, absent a hope of cure, does not make the prolongation of life
desirable. One such person who shares this belief is the subject of the
5. Giancola, The Discontinuation of "Extraordinary" Medical Treatment from
a Terminal Patient: A Physician's Civil Liability in New York, 26 MED. TRIAL TECH.
Q. 326, 327 n.6 (1980). Black's defines "euthanasia" as "[t]he act or practice of pain-
lessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease as an
act of mercy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 497 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). See
also J. Sanders, Euthanasia: None Dare" Call It Murder, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOL-
OGY & POLICE SC. 351 (1969); 0. RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE (rev. ed. 1977).
6. See Hirsch & Donovan, The Right to Die: Medico-Legal Implications of In re
Quinlan, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 267 (1977).
7. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) Twenty-one-year-old Karen
Quinlan was diagnosed as being in a permanent vegetative state, having lapsed into a
coma after an intake of alcohol and drugs. Her father sought to be appointed as her
guardian to authorize the withdrawal of extraordinary treatment enabling her to die
naturally. This case was the first to determine what constitutes "extraordinary" treat-
ment. Withdrawal of Karen's respirator was permitted by the court. See Cantor, Quin-
lan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REv.
254 (1977); LADIES' HOME J., May, 1980, at 90; TRIAL, September, 1976, at 36; J.
LEGAL MED., May, 1976, at 28.
8. See Note, The Right to Die: A Proposal for Natural Death Legislation, 49 U.
CIN. L. REV. 228 (1980).
9. Miami Herald, Apr. 27, 1980, § BR, at 8, col. 1.
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following hypothetical case.
Our patient is an elderly man residing in Florida, having moved
from California two years ago. He exists in a permanent vegetative
state,10 assisted by a mechanical respirator. Usually, this situation
would create all the problems involved in recent cases concerning
whether to withdraw life-supporting treatment and allow the patient to
die. In such cases, the courts have speculated as to whether the patient
would have wanted to die. Usually the patient has never contemplated
such a problem, as the average person avoids facing the prospect of
dying. However, in this case our patient, while a resident of California,
executed a directive, otherwise known as a "living will," ' stating that
he be allowed to die if he becomes terminally ill or is maintained by
extraordinary treatment.
More than four million copies of the living will have been distrib-
uted in the past twelve years, mostly in response to individual re-
quests.1 2 Lawyers, physicians and hospitals have distributed them to
their clients and patients. These living wills are available in legal
parchment form or as permanent wallet-size cards. Although the living
will is a recognized document, included in Modern Legal Forms,"3 the
legality of enforcing a living will has never been tested in court. Never-
theless, it remains as an expression of one's right to self-determination
over his body, relieving the family and physician of all responsibility for
the patient's death.
Our patient's living will stated that "if the situation should arise in
which there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from extreme
physical or mental disability, I direct that I should be allowed to die
and not be kept alive by medications, artificial means or heroic mea-
10. This is a state where the individual has no significant cognitive functions, but
may be partially responsive. Cognitive functions include the ability to think, feel, see
and communicate. Pollick, "Cognitive" and "Sapient" - Which Death is the Real
Death? 136 AMER. J. SURGERY 3, 5-6 (1978).
11. The task of considering whether the patient would wish to exercise this right
is considerably easier where he has expressed his intent not to have his life prolonged
beyond a certain point, especially if he made his "living will" in contemplation of ill-
ness or death.
12. 6 Concern For Dying Newsletter 2 (Spring 1980). Forms for "The Living
Will" can be obtained by writing, Concern For Dying, 250 West 57th Street, New
York, New York 10019.
13. STONE, MODERN LEGAL FORMS § 10199 (Supp. 1980).
3
Havens: In re Living Will
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
1448 Nv 
a ora 
:9
sures." Further, the document stated that he was of sound mind, that
the document represented his wishes, and that those who carried out
his wishes would be free from any liability. His living will included
additional provisions concerning transplantation of his organs at death,
the names of those persons with whom he had discussed his wishes, and
a statement designating what measures he qualified as extraordinary or
artificial.
California had passed natural death legislation in 1976 which rec-
ognized the right to die in certain situations, 1' but after a decade of
futile attempts, Florida had not yet passed such natural death or right
to die legislation when our client moved here. Aware of this fact, he
reexecuted his living will and distributed copies to his attorney, physi-
cian, clergyman, and family. In addition, he carried a minature copy of
his living will in his wallet to assure that his wishes would be followed
if he were to be found in an unconscious state, unable to express his
wishes. A copy of his living will follows:
MY LIVING WILL
This is a declaration of my right to die and a directive that my
wishes be carried out.
14. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1979):
The Legislature finds that adult persons have the fundamental right to con-
trol the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including
the decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in in-
stances of a terminal condition.
The Legislature further finds that modern medical technology has made
possible the artifical prolongation of human life beyond natural limits.
The Legislature further finds that, in the interest of protecting individual
autonomy, such prolongation of life for persons with a terminal condition may
cause loss of patient dignity, and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing
nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the patient.
The Legislature further finds that there exists considerable uncertainty in
the medical and legal professions as to the legaility of terminating the use or
application of life-sustaining procedures where the patient has voluntarily and in
sound mind evidenced a desire that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn.
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients have a right to ex-
pect, the Legislature hereby declares that the laws of the State of California
shall recognize the right of an adult person to make a written directive in-
structing his physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the
event of a terminal condition.
5:19811
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
On this 30 day of March, 1979, in the city of Ft. Lauderdale in the
county of Broward of the state of Florida, I do hereby make known my
wishes that I be allowed to die if I should ever encounter a situation
where I, as a result of extreme physical or mental disability or incurable
illness from which death will follow, have to be or already am being kept
alive by such extraordinary or artificial medical treatment as I have de-
scribed below, and there is little or no chance of my recovery to a cogni-
tive and sapient life according to all current medical knowledge prac-
ticed in this community and two physicians, one being my attending
physician. If such extraordinary treatment will only serve to artifically
prolong my death and not to preserve my life, I request that such proce-
dures be withheld or withdrawn and that I may be permitted to die
naturally.
I do hereby make this expression of my wishes voluntarily, being of
sound mind and of majority age. I do hereby declare that my physician,
upon carrying out my wishes in good faith, shall be immune from civil or
criminal liability and not in violation of §782.08 Florida Statutes. If my
physician refuses to act in accordance with my wishes, he should direct
my care to another physician who will do so.
Additional Provisions
(1) I have discussed my wishes to have life-supporting treatment
withheld or withdrawn with the following who understand these wishes:
Jane Doe (relationship) wife
Richard Doe (relationship) son
May Doe (relationship) sister
(2) I consider the following measures of medical treatment ex-
traordinary or artificial; as such, these measures should not be performed
upon me:
mechanical respirator
nemodialysis machine
cardiac pacemaker
(3) If any of my organs would be valuable as transplants to help others,
I freely give my consent that they be donated for such use, at the point of my
legal and medical death.
(4) This guarantees that if, any time prior to or at the time of my death,
I am competent and wish to change or revoke this living will, I will be allowed
to do so in writing or orally in the presence of two persons, one being my
physician.
5
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(5) My terminal condition is diffus cerebral and brain stem anoxia re-
sulting from cardio-respiratory arrest. This must be completed as the only
evidence of a terminal condition. Diagnosed this 20 day of January, 1979 by
John Smith M.D.
200 Bay Drive (address)
Oceanview Medical Center (medical center)
(6) This directive shall have no effect after 5 years from this date unless
reexecuted, and it will be my responsibility to see that this is done.
(7) To the Medical Center: A copy of this directive shall be made part
of my medical records at the medical center at which I am subsequently hospi-
talized and/or administered such extraordinary treatment.
To the Nursing Home: If I am under care of a nursing home (per Chap.
400 Florida Statutes) at such time as I am required to reexecute my living
will, I shall have the assistance of a patient ombudsman (per §400.307 Florida
Statutes) for the purpose of preventing undue influence or fraud.
(8) I guarantee that a qualified attorney has inspected this document
and is satisfied that all formal requirements of execution have been met.
Signed: /s/ John Doe
We, as witnesses, to vouch for the sound mind of the signer-that he is
emotionally and mentally competent and that these are his true wishes and
that he signed voluntarily in our presence today, without any undue influence
from any physician or family member. We are not in any way whatsoever
related to the signer or in any way whatsoever a beneficiary of any interest of
the estate of the signer, or in any way whatsoever financially responsible for or
involved with the signer's hospitilization.
Witness Shawn Richards
Witness David Adams
Copies of this document have been distributed to the following:
My attorney Richard Brown, Esquire
address 100 Oceanfront Drive - Ft. Lauderdale,
FL
My physician John Smith, M.D.
address 200 Bay Drive - Ft. Lauderdale, FL
My clergyman William Jones
address 800 Seagrape Lane - Ft. Lauderdale, FL
My family Jane Doe
address 100 River Drive - Ft. Lauderdale, FL
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Our patient is now in a permanent vegetative state, having lapsed
into an irreversible coma following cardio-respiratory arrest. He is be-
ing maintained on a respirator. Earlier, his family had agreed to honor
his "living will" but now has second thoughts. In addition, his physi-
cian now fears criminal liability and refuses to withdraw the extraordi-
nary treatment. Our patient's attorney, who has been an advocate of
"right to die" legislation in Florida, presents this case of first impres-
sion to the court to determine the legality of this living will.
This case has been predicted in Florida since the recent case of
Satz v. Perlmutter,5 wherein the court recognized a patient's right to
die. Mr Perlmutter, a competent adult, expressed his wish to discon-
tinue the extraordinary medical treatment which was prolonging his
life at the time such treatment was being administered. In contrast Mr.
Doe is comatose, incompetent to presently communicate his wishes.
Mr. Doe provided for his present situation by previously expressing his
wishes in his living will.
Mr. Doe's attorney will attempt to persuade the Florida court to
recognize his client's living will and the wishes expressed therein. Since
the Supreme Court of Florida arguably recognized a competent pa-
tient's right to decide to die, with dignity, expressed in his "contempo-
raneous living will,""6 the court should recognize this same right to die
with dignity expressed in the patient's previously executed "living will."
Mr. Doe is incapable of expressing his wishes contemporaneously with
his illness since he is comatose. He expressed his right to die at the only
time when he personally could exercise this right; he was competent
before the onset of this illness. If incompetents and competents are to
be treated equally with regard to their constitutional right to privacy,
the court must recognize Mr. Doe's wishes in his living will.
15. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affid, 379
So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). The trial court permitted and the Supreme Court upheld the
withdrawal of the respirator from Abe Perlmutter, a competent, terminally ill adult
who had no minor dependents but had the unanimous approval of his family. Id. See
Note, Death with Dignity and the Terminally Ill: The Need for Legislative Action, 4
NOVA L.J. 257 (1980).
16. 6 Concern For Dying Newsletter 2 (Spring 1980).
4511In re Living Will
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DEFINING EXTRAORDINARY TREATMENT
In his living will, our patient refers to heroic or extraordinary mea-
sures. What constitutes extraordinary treatment will inevitably affect
the outcome of this case. The distinction between extraordinary and
ordinary treatment 7 is critical, since judicial decision dictate that a
patient is not always free to refuse ordinary treatment when such re-
fusal would affect the patient's death. 8 The court should classify the
respirator as extraordinary treatment in conformance with our patient's
living will, as it cannot cure his condition but, at best, can only prolong
his inevitable death. Therefore, our patient should be free to refuse the
treatment.
As medical technology progresses, once extraordinary treatment
quickly becomes ordinary treatment. Opposing counsel may argue that
we cannot justify withdrawal of the respirator as an extraordinary mea-
sure, because it may be considered ordinary tommorow. This argument
is without substance, because the courts and physicians must handle
the case at the time when it arises. Arguing hypothetical future ad-
vances does not solve the instant problems.
This ordinary-extraordinary dichotomy was a determinative issue
in Quinlan,"9 where the New Jersey Supreme Court had to determine
whether a respirator was an extraordinary method of treatment. The
court stated:
[W]hile the record here is somewhat hazy in distinguishing between
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" measures, one would have to think that
the use of the same respirator or like support could be considered "ordi-
17. Ordinary treatment is usually described as treatment that offers a reasonable
benefit without excessive pain, expense or inconvenience. Extraordinary treatment is
treatment that offers no reasonable benefit and cannot be used without excessive pain,
expense or inconvenience. Hirsh & Donovan, supra note 6, at 290.
18. Most cases have involved religious grounds, because patients are almost cer-
tain to recover if they accept the treatment. See Application of President and Directors
of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 331 F.2d 1010
(D.C. Cir. 1964) (the court ordered a blood transfusion against the wishes of the pa-
tient-a Jehovah's Witness who had suffered massive blood loss from a ruptured ulcer).
See also In re Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d
372 (D.C. 1972).
19. 70 N.J. at -, 355 A.2d at 669. See also Hirsch & Donovan supra note 6,
at 290.
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 6
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss3/6
In re Living Will5:1981 453 1
nary" in the context of the possibly curable patient but "extraordinary"
in the context of the forced sustaining by cardio-respiratory processes of
an irreversibly doomed patient.20
In certain situations, such as paralytic poliomyelitis,2 1 even artifi-
cal respiration is not an 'extraordinary' means.
The Quinlan court (as well as physicians) lacked guidelines defin-
ing extraordinary measures. Unfortunately, it did not set forth any
guidelines for use in future situations involving the ordinary versus ex-
traordinary debate.22 Until recently this distinction largely had been
considered of only medical significance. However, the potentiality for
criminal prosecutions mandate formulation of distinct legal guidelines.
Some Florida legislators have proposed such guidelines, but none have
acquired support. 3
The American Medical Association sanctions the "cessation of the
employment of extraordinary means to prolong the life of the body
when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is imminent."2'
The Vatican issued formal declarations in 1957, wherein Pope Pius XII
stressed that no obligation exists to use extraordinary means to prolong
life or to give a physician permission to use them. 5 In July, 1980, Pope
20. Id. at 48, 355 A.2d at 667-68.
21. Paralytic poliomyelitis: "an acute viral disease, occurring sporadically and in
epidemics, and characterized clinically by fever, sore throat, headaches, vomiting, often
with stiffness of the neck and back ... characterized by ... paralysis." DORLAND'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1230 (25th ed. 1974). There may be subsequent atrophy of
groups of muscles, ending in contraction and permanent deformity. Id.
22. 70 N.J. at 48, 355 A.2d at 667-68.
23. Fla. H.R.J. Res. 91 (1969); Fla. H.R. 3184 (1970); Fla. H.R. 68 (1971);
Fla. H.R. 2614 (1972); Fla. H.R. 2830 (1972); Fla. H.R. 407 (1973-74); Fla. H.R.J.
Res. 3007 (1974); Fla. H.R. 239 (1975); Fla. H.R. 2463 (1976); Fla. H.R.J. Res. 2575
(1976); Fla. H.R. 3703 (1976); Fla. S. 513 (1976); Fla. H.R. 374 (1977); Fla. H.R. 8
(1978); Fla. H.R. 740 (1979); and Fla. H.R. 463 (1980); Fla. S. 446 (1980).
24. A.M.A. News, Dec., 1973 at 15, col. 2.
25. It is incumbent upon the physician to take all reasonable, ordinary
means of restoring the vital functions and consciousness, and to employ
such extraordinary means as are available to him to this end. It is not
obligatory, however, to continue to use extraordinary means indefinitely in
hopeless cases, but normally one is held to use only ordinary
means-according to the circumstances of persons, places, times, and cul-
tures-that is to say, means that do not involve any grave burden for one-
9
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John Paul II approved a flexible new set of guidelines on euthanasia
after consultations with medical experts and moral theologians.26 Rely-
ing on the Catholic teaching that God alone has the right to give life or
end it, the Vatican through Pope Paul II nonetheless declared that life
need not be prolonged by extraordinary means. When inevitable death
is imminent, patients may refuse forms of treatment that would only
secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life.27 If there is
no duty to deliver extraordinary care to our patient, he must be permit-
ted to have his "plug pulled."
Opposing counsel will interject that we have invented an attractive
way out of the dilemma which technology has created, since all tech-
nology may be viewed as extraordinary, thereby justifying pulling the
plug. In response, we will assure the court that it is not our intention to
classify all technology as extraordinary. What is ordinary or extraordi-
nary treatment will vary from patient to patient as medical science pro-
gresses.28 Nevertheless, the law must set guidelines and criteria estab-
lishing when medical procedures can be withdrawn. Questions of
legality will inevitably surface in the form of homicide, malpractice,
and life insurance litigation. Case law on the right to die illustrates
that criteria used in determining extraordinary treatment must draw
heavily on medical expertise and prevailing medical practices in the
community.29 This court must inject law into this theory; otherwise
physicians will be in a position to fashion their own law to prolong life
according to customary practices, and this will evoke inconsistency.
RIGHT OF PRIVACY BASIS
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly recog-
nize a right of privacy, the Supreme Court has recognized its existence
self or another. There comes a time when resuscitative efforts should stop
and death be unopposed.
Pope Pius XII, Prolongation of Life, 4 AM. Q. PAPAL DOCTRINE 393 (1958).
26. NEWSWEEK, July 7, 1980, at 58; TIME, July 7, 1980, at 49.
27. NEWSWEEK, supra note 26, at 58.
28. 70 N.J. at 43, 355 A.2d at 667-68.
29. In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 617 P.2d 731 (1980) (en banc); Severns v.
Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980). Lovato v. District Court In
and For Tenth Jud. Dist., 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
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since Union Pacific Railroad v. Botsford.30 The right of personal pri-
vacy has been discussed within the penumbra of specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights,31 and from language of the first, 2 fourth, fifth,33
ninth,3 and fourteenth amendments.3 5 The Court's decisions articulate
that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "im-
plicit" in the concept of "ordered liberty" are included in this guaran-
tee of personal privacy. This constitutional guarantee reached out in
Roe v. Wades6 to protect a woman's decision to terminate her preg-
nancy. The same guarantee extends to preserve one's right to privacy,
or common law right of bodily self-determination, against unwanted
infringements of bodily integrity in appropriate circumstances.37
We would argue that our patient's constitutionally based right of
privacy guarantees him the right to reject further medical treatment.
The Court in Superintendent of Belchertown State Schools v.
Saikewicz38 opined that it was "not inconsistent to recognize a right to
decline medical treatment in a situation of incurable illness." The court
articulated that a
constitutional right to privacy . . . is an expression of the sanctity of
individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents
of life. That the value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision
to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being
30. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
34. 381 U.S. at 484, 486-99.
35. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (a landmark decision where the
court declared that a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy in the first trimester
was protected by the constitutionally-guaranteed right of privacy, limited only by a
compelling state interest in the preservation of life). Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
37. 70 N.J. at , 355 A.2d at 663.
38. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977). The court upheld the refusal of
chemotherapy for acute leukemia for a severely retarded adult and enumerated four
state interests: "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interest of inno-
cent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integ-
rity of the medical profession." Id. at __, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
1 5:1981
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the right of choice.39
Recognizing this constitutional right, the court in Quinlan noted
"that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval. . . and
perceptive of her irreversible condition, she could effectively decide
upon discontinuance of the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the
prospect of natural death."'40 Karen was in a chronic vegetative state
and was assisted in breathing by a respirator. She was able to maintain
some internal functions such as body temperature and blood pressure,
but she had lost most cognitive brain function. Even though Karen was
not able to express a preference for death with dignity over life as a
vegetable, the court concluded that no compelling state interest should
compel Karen to endure the unendurable.41
In 1914, Justice Cardozo mandated that "[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body. . . .-42 We propose no interpretation other
than that this right incorporate the right to die. Logically, the right to
initially refuse treatment is concomitant with the right to discontinue
or have such treatment withdrawn once it has been initiated. The indi-
vidual patient knows his capacity for pain, his family's emotional and
financial stability, and his own emotional makeup. In Eichner v. Dil-
lon4" the court asserted that an individual has the right to "control his
own person." Therefore, we will argue that our patient's right to pri-
vacy will be violated if his body continues to be invaded by these medi-
cal procedures.
Courts have limited this right to privacy, restricting conduct which
is outweighed by public policy considerations. If the conduct offends
the public policy and a substantial state interest exists, the individual's
39. Id. at 426.
40. 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
41. Id.
42. Scholoendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914) (primarily involved the "informed consent" doctrine).
43. Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980). A priest won
judicial approval to withdraw extraordinary, life-supporting treatment (respirator)
from Brother Joseph Fox, a 83-year-old religious brother who had lapsed into a perma-
nent vegetative state after a cardiac arrest. The court determined from his prior con-
versations with Brother Fox that he would want to die in this situation. Id.
456 Nova Law Journal
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right to privacy may have to defer to the state interest." In Saikewicz,
the court enumerated four state interests including:
1) the preservation of life;
2) the protection of innocent third parties;
3) the prevention of suicide;
4) the maintenance of true ethical integrity of the medical
profession. 45
The court in Perlmutter adopted the four public policy considera-
tions as limitations on the individual's right to privacy.' 6 Since Perl-
mutter remains the authority in Florida, we shall demonstrate that we
have overcome these limitations.
In Saikewicz, the court distinguished between preserving a valua-
ble life and preserving an artificial life (i.e., a brain-dead person in a
permanent vegetative state), placing the emphasis on preserving the
valuable life.'7 Our terminally ill patient has no life left to preserve.
Therefore, no compelling state interest can surmount our patient's right
of privacy under the Roe test.48
Another state interest is the protection of innocent third parties. In
Mr. Doe's case, no unborn children are involved as in Roe and no mi-
nor children as in the Application of President & Directors of Ge-
orgetown College, where the patient's refusal of treatment would have
been an abandonment of his minor child." In Perlmutter, the court
distinguished its limited decision from Georgetown."0 Even if Mr. Doe
had minor children he would not live to support them due to his termi-
nal illness. Therefore, the state has no compelling interest to override
our patient's constitutional right to privacy and refusal of medical
treatment.
44. 410 U.S. at 154-55.
45. 373 Mass. at , 370 N.E. 2d at 425.
46. 362 So. 2d at 162.
47. 373 Mass. at , 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
48. 410 U.S. at 154. "The right of personal privacy ... is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation. Where certain 'fun-
damental rights' are involved ... regulation limiting these rights may be justified only
by a 'compelling state interest."' Id. at 155.
49. 331 F.2d at 1008.
50. 362 So. 2d at 162.
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The third interest is the state's duty to prevent suicide. We shall
adopt Saikewicz and argue that if our patient's respirator is discon-
nected, death will result from natural causes instead of from the respi-
rator's removal. 5' We can negate suicide by demonstrating that our pa-
tient did not induce his affliction, and he did wish to live but for his
terminal condition. Therefore, there is no compelling state interest in
our patient's case.
The final state interest listed by the court in Saikewicz was the
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical practice. Perlmutter
again adopted the language of Saikewicz in its recognition that the
right to refuse necessary treatment in appropriate circumstances is con-
sistent with existing medical mores.52 Such a doctrine threatens neither
the integrity of the medical profession nor the hospital's role in caring
for such patients. Therefore, our patient's right of privacy has out-
weighed these four judicially determined public policy interests.
Reemphasizing, we maintain that the state's interest in preserving
life is less when death is merely postponed rather than when life is
preserved. The Quinlan court declared that the state's interest in the
preservation of life diminishes and "the individual's right to privacy
grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the .prognosis
dims."53 In In re Quackenbush," the court upheld the patient's right to
refuse treatment, the amputation of both legs, since this treatment was
an extensive bodily invasion.
In addition, in Saikewicz, the court stated that the right of privacy
encompasses the right to die;55 a right with which the state should not
interfere in the absence of minor or unborn children and a clear and
present danger to the public welfare or morale.5 In Georgetown, the
court indicated it would enforce its interest in preserving life and over-
rule the right of privacy (i.e., right to die) when the bodily invasion
ceased, when a reasonable expectation of recovery existed, or when mi-
nors or other third parties were involved, whose lives would be jeopard-
51. 373 Mass. at -, 370 N.E.2d at 421.
52. 362 So. 2d at 163.
53. 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
54. In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978).
55. "To die" is used in the context of a right to refuse non-consensual bodily
invasions. 373 Mass. at - , 370 N.E.2d at 424.
56. Id. at - , 370 N.E.2d at 424-26.
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ized by the patient's death. Comparing the incompetent patient in
Eichner to the first trimester in Roe, we reason that both were incapa-
ble of independent, meaningful existence. The state's compelling inter-
est in life's preservation only attached when the potential existed for
return to a sapient, cognitive life (Eichner) or when the fetus was via-
ble (Roe). Our patient is terminally ill without hope of returning to a
natural existence unaided by artificial life support technology. There-
fore our patient should be allowed to die, without artificially prolonging
his life.
In affirming Perlmutter, the Florida Supreme Court reinforced the
district court's decision to limit the case to its facts. Perlmutter applies
to only competent terminally ill adult patients with no minor depen-
dents and who have the consent of all affected family members.58 We
disagree with the provision requiring familial consent, because the right
of privacy is a personal right. As such, we do not advocate the state
delegating to third parties its own power to override an individual's
right to privacy where this promotes state interests. The adult patient
alone should exercise his constitutional right. When the patient is in-
competent and unable to exercise this right at the time of his illness,
the state should recognize the legality of the living will. Recognizing
the expressed wishes contained therein, the state would prevent the ex-
ercise of this personal constitutional right by third parties.
In conclusion, we point out the recent passage of House Joint Res-
olution 387 which created Section 23 of Article I of the Florida State
Constitution recognizing a right of privacy.59 In Florida, the right to
die is based on the right of privacy; therefore, this recent constitutional
amendment supports the right to die naturally and the right to refuse
prolongation of life through artificial means.
57. 331 F.2d at 1000.
58. 379 So. 2d at 359 (affirming lower court's ruling upholding patient's right to
refuse medical treatment).
59. Fla. H.R.J. Res. 387, (1980) (approved by voters in the November, 1980,
general election.) "Right of Privacy: Every natural person has the right to be let alone
and free from governmental intrusion into this private life except as otherwise provided
herein. . . ." FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23.
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FLORIDA'S BRAIN DEATH STATUTE"0
An issue that confronts many courts is when life-supporting mea-
sures can be terminated. The law has always adopted the medical defi-
nition of death.61 However, in light of recent medical developments, the
legal definition of death is changing and the old "heart-lung death"
definition is outmoded. 2
The medical profession's current definition dictates that if the
brain is dead the patient is dead, even though a patient's vital organs
60. FLA. STAT § 382.085 (Supp. 1980) provides:
Recognition of brain death.
(1) For legal and medical purposes, where respiratory and circulatory func-
tions are maintained by artificial means of support so as to preclude a determina-
tion that these functions have ceased, the occurrence of death may be determined
where there is the irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, determined in accordance with this section.
(2) Determination of death pursuant to this section shall be made in accor-
dance with currently accepted reasonable medical standards by two physicians
licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459. One physician shall be the treating
physician, and the other physician shall be a board-eligible or board-certified
neurologist, neurosurgeon, internist, pediatrician, surgeon or anesthesiologist.
(3) The next of kin of the patient shall be notified as soon as practicable of
the procedures to determine death under this act. The medical records shall re-
flect such notice; if such notice has not been given the medical records shall
reflect the attempts to identify and notify the next of kin.
(4) No recovery shall be allowed nor criminal proceedings be instituted in
any court in this state against a physician or licensed medical facility that makes
a determination of death in accordance with this section or which acts in reliance
thereon, if such determination is made in accordance with the accepted standard
of care for such physician or facility as set forth in s. 768.45. Except for a diag-
nosis of brain death, the standard set forth in this section is not the exclusive
standard for determining death or for the withdrawal of life support systems.
An analysis of several states' brain death statutes can be found in the note, Toward a
Legally and Medically Acceptable Definition of Death, immediately following this
paper.
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (5th ed. 1979) defines "death" as "[t]he ces-
sation of life, the ceasing to exist, defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the
circulation of blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions consequent
thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."
62. M. Green & D. Wilder, Brain Death and Personal Identity, 9 PHILOSOPHY
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 105 (1980).
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are maintained by machinery. 3 Brain death is the state when an indi-
vidual has no reflexes other than spinal reflexes, a flat electroencephalo-
gram (EEG) indicating a complete absence of purposeful electrical ac-
tivity in the cortex, and no capacity to breathe on his own." This
discrepancy between the positions of law and medicine on the definition
of death places physicians in the precarious position of facing possible
criminal sanctions under the legal definition of death. The "heart-lung
death" concept can no longer remain valid in light of modern resuscita-
tive technology, which can virtually revive even those with no chance of
survival. Recent developments in the area of transplants6 5 have created
a demand for organs which have been removed after the donor's death,
but before the death of the tissues. As a result, a concern to pinpoint
the precise time of death has emerged.
Physicians adhere to the brain death6 definition in order to pro-
ceed with transplants while the vital organs are maintainable by ma-
chinery, thereby facilitating and increasing the number of possible
transplants. Physicians, however, may be criminally guilty of homicide,
if the law retains the "heart-lung death" definition of death. If sur-
geons are required to wait until the heart stops the donor may be "le-
gally dead," but the organs may be worthless for transplants.
63. In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 617 P.2d 731, 733 (1980) (en banc).
64. Id.
65. See F. Stuart, Progress In Legal Definition of Brain Death and Consent to
Remove Cadaver Organs, 81 SURGERY 68 (1977); Note, The Criteria For Determining
Death in Vital Organ Transplants - A Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220
(1973).
66. In Lovator v. District Court, - Colo. , 601 P.2d 1072 (1979) the court
defined brain death under the Uniform Brain Death Act: "For legal and medical pur-
poses, an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning of the
brain, including the brain stem is dead." Id. at ___, 601 P.2d at 1080.
"Characteristics of brain death consist of: (1) unreceptivity and unresponsiveness
to externally applied stimuli and internal needs; (2) no spontaneous movements or
breathing; (3) no reflex activity; and (4) a flat electroencephalogram reading after a 24
hour period of observation. Comm. v. Golston, - Mass. -, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977).
An increasing number of states have adopted this so-called "Harvard" definition of
brain death, either by statute or court decision." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 170 (5th
ed. 1979). See also M. Green & D. Wilder, supra note 62; 238 J. A.M.A. 1651-55
(1977); 238 J. A.M.A. 1744-48 (1977); P. Green, Brain Death, 78 WIs. MED. J. 13
(1979); Status of the Legal Definition of Death, 5 NEUROSURGERY 535 (1979); Brain
Death, supra.
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The growing need for transplant organs alone does not justify de-
claring "death" perfunctorily. Physicians need a brain death standard
for uniformity so they can make legal as well as wise medical decisions.
Courts, scrutinizing physicians' conduct, have found that extraordinary
treatment was continued on terminal patients, in substantial part, due
to the increasing proliferation of malpractice litigation and possible
criminal liability.67 Physicians have been heard to say, "Let's not pull
the plug," fearing criminal liability. Thus, legal concerns rather than a
patient's best medical interest may dictate a physician's actions.
Preeminent medical panels have posted new death criteria for
resolving the dilemma spawned by recent technological advances. In
1968, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School adopted
the "permanent cessation of brain function" as the definition of
death.68
Criteria used in diagnosing a patient as "brain dead," include the
following:
(1) pupils fixed and dilated;
(2) no extraocular movements, evident by using caloric testing or
doll's eyes;69
(3) no spontaneous respiration without a ventilator;
(4) no motor or sensory response to neurologic testing;
(5) patient completely flexic;70 and
(6) no normal cerebral activity evident on the EEG.71
The question then arises whether the patient is "legally" dead
though the heart continues to beat. If in all brain dead patients who are
67. G. Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision-Making for the
Terminally Ill and Incompetent, 4 AMER. J. L. & MED. 367, 395 (1979).
68. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); A Definition of Irreversible
Coma, 205 J. A.M.A. 85 (1968).
69. Doll's eyes is an oculocephalic reflex. P. Green, supra note 66, at 17. 5
CLINICAL NUCLEAR MED. 152 (April 1980).
70. Flexic means the absence of reflexes. C. Nagle, Use of Immediate Stutic
Scans in Combination with Radionuclide Cerebral Angiography as a Confirmatory
Test in the Diagnosis of Brain Death. See An Appraisal of the Criteria of Cerebral
Death, 237 J. A.M.A. 982 (1977).
71. Electroencephalogram (EEG): "An EEG reading is obtained by attaching
electrodes to the patients' head and examining the brain wave on a monitor." Com-
ment, The Criteria For Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants - A Medico-
Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220, 224 n.24 (1973).
1462 Nova Law Journal 5:19811
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not being sustained by a respirator, their hearts will not beat and in all
brain death patients who are being assisted by a respirator, their hearts
do beat, logic dictates that the respirator keeps the heart beating, not
life. A machine can create an artificial heartbeat. Thus, these patients
are not medically "alive." Why should these patients be legally alive,
when not medically alive? These differences must be reconciled. The
traditional definition of death was formulated when a heartbeat could
not be artifically sustained.
The most recent test for determining brain death is a radionuclide
cerebral angiogram (RCA) .72 In this test, isotope angiography reveals
the condition of the vessels supplying blood to the brain. The absence
of intracranial blood flow on the dynamic RCA, caused by the lack of
uptake in cerebral sinuses, confirms a diagnosis of brain-death. RCA
enjoys a distinct advantage over other tests for determining brain
death. The results obtained by a RCA are not affected by drugs. Other
tests (utilizing an EEG) do not determine brain death as accurately in
a patient whose coma is due to drug intoxication.73 Studies show that it
is still possible to resuscitate an unconscious patient (due to an over-
dose of sedatives, tranquilizers, narcotics, or hypothermia) for up to six
hours after the appearance of a flat EEG.7 4 Therefore, the RCA is a
major step forward in determining brain death and in contributing to
one "medico-legal" definition of death.
While the guidelines for determining death may differ with the
particular test, all require repeated determinations or reexaminations
after specified time intervals. Despite the growing recognition among
physicans of the brain death test, confusion is prevelant. Physicians,
faced with the recent surge of medical malpractice litigation, need set
standards promoting uniformity to conform their medical decisions to
legal standards.
Since 1971, twenty-six states have enacted statutory definitions of
brain death. 5 In 1978, the National Conference of Commissioners on
72. RCA is an x-ray visualization of the vascular system of the brain. See Triage
in Patient Care, 8 HEART & LUNG 1103, 1105 (1979).
73. Appraisal, supra note 71.
74. Id.
75. 1979 ALA. AcTs 165; ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 82-537 (1977); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (Deering 1975); CONN.
PUBLIc AcT 79-556; GA. CODE § 88-1715.1 (1975); HAWAii REV. STAT. § 327C-1
4631
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Uniform State Laws approved the "Uniform Brain Death Act" which
provides that "[flor legal and medical purposes an individual who has
sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning76 of the brain, includ-
ing the brain stem, is dead. 7 7
In Florida, in 1980, a brain death bill7 8 was introduced at the re-
quest of certain hospitals. This bill, which became law on October 1,
1980, states that death is to be determined where there is irreversible
cessation of the functioning of the entire brain, including the brain
stem. It further states that for legal and medical purposes a determina-
tion of death is to be made where respiratory and circulatory functions
are maintainable only by artificial means of support. It maintains that
no criminal proceedings will be instituted in any court in this state
against any physician or medical facility making a determination of
death in accordance with this statute. It warns that brain-death is not
the exclusive standard for determining death or the withdrawal of life-
supporting systems. We maintain that our patient is both legally and
medically dead, and therefore the physician should disconnect the
respirator.
THE PHYSICIAN'S ROLE
The physician, in our case, fears criminal sanctions if he carries
out the patient's wishes to have treatment withdrawn as the legality of
(Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 552 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE § 702.8 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202
(Supp. 1979); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 9-111 (West Supp. 1979); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 43, § 54F (1980); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 333.1021 (1980); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 50-22-101 (1979); NEV. REV. STATS. § 451.007 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
12-2-4 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Cum. Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit.
63 § 1-301 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.087 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. 53-459
(1977); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. § 4447t (Vernon Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 54-
325.7 (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 16-19-1 (Supp. 1980); Wyo. STAT. § 35-19-101
(Supp. 1980); and Fla. S.B. 293.
76. "Functioning" meaning purposeful activity in all parts of the brain, as distin-
guished from random activity. M. Green, supra note 69.
77. Lovato, - Colo. at -, 601 P.2d at 1080.
78. Fla. S. 293 FLA. STAT. § 832.085 (Supp. 1980). See note 60 supra for the
text of FLA. STAT. § 382.085 (Supp. 1980).
79. Fla. S.B. 293 (1980).
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the "living will" has not yet been determined in this state. With the
rise in malpractice suits, physicians have had to be extremely cautious
as well as secretive in their actions. In 1961, a survey conducted at a
Chicago medical convention revealed that more than half of the physi-
cians present believed euthanasia was being practiced by members of
the profession. 0 In testimony before a 1974 Senate subcommittee,8 1 it
was revealed that about three-fourths of American physicians practiced
passive euthanasia regularly, that is, they withdrew artificial life sup-
port, permitting the patients to die. 2
In Quinlan, it was acknowledged that it was not unusual in the
medical community for physicians to terminate or withhold extraordi-
nary treatment in terminal cases without resort to the law.83 Few physi-
cians have been prosecuted for such actions and fewer have been con-
victed. Therefore, legislation could only have a positive effect, for the
state of affairs as it now exists is without controls, and is insufferable.
We do not question the state's undoubted power to punish the tak-
ing of human life, but that power should not prevent an individual from
refusing medical treatment pursuant to his right to privacy. In Perl-
mutter, it was argued that the patient's ensuing death should not be
classified as homicide, but rather death from existing natural causes.
Since the patient was sustained by a respirator, its withdrawal left the
patient's system in control and death would ensue naturally.8 In Quin-
lan, the court determined that the termination of treatment was lawful
because it was justifiable under the circumstances. 5 Therefore, the ter-
mination of our patient's treatment could not be considered
"unlawful."
The advantages of the living will are obvious. If a physician were
80. Voluntary Mercy Death, 8 J. FOR. MED. 57, 68 (1961).
81. Medical Ethics: The Right to Survival: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Health of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974).
82. Id.
83. 70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 667. See Horan, The "Right to Die" Legislative
and Judicial Developments, 13 FORUM 488 (1978).
84. 362 So. 2d at 1.
85. 70 N.J. at 43, 355 A.2d at 668. 394 U.S. at 559. In Florida, it is a felony to
assist another in the commission of self-murder. "Every person deliberately assisting
another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of manslaughter, a felony of
the second degree. . . ." FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (1979).
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prosecuted for permitting a patient to die when that patient's life could
have been prolonged by extraordinary treatment, the physician would
have a strong defense in the living will. On the other hand, if the physi-
cian refused to honor the living will and maintained the patient on ex-
traordinary treatment, the physician might be sued more successfully
for pain, suffering, and expense caused by the unauthorized treat-
ment. 6 Our patient's living will will give renewed confidence to all phy-
sicians and family members performing in accordance with its
provisions.
LITIGATION V. LEGISLATION
Court decisions in the past six years have substantially supported
the patient's right to refuse treatment. This right must be accepted by
the legal and medical professions, in order that it might be invoked
without the delay and uncertainty involved in seeking judicial
approval.8 7
The Perlmutter case determined that the issue of the right to die
was more suitable for the state legislature.88 Proponents stress that the
legislature is more capable of investigating and synthesizing the facts
and opinions that may be relevant to the resolution of such a complex
legal, medical, and social issue. In addition, a legislative directive
would eliminate the problem of uniformity inherent in a case-by-case
approach to the problem. Critics of natural death legislation fear that
after the living will is legalized, enabling passive euthanasia to be prac-
ticed, the next step would be the legalization of active euthanisia.89
They maintain that while the withdrawal of life-supporting treatment
can be rationalized under existing legal doctrines, the authorization of
86. Courts have uniformly held that it is an assault and battery upon a person to
administer medical treatment that he does not want. Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d
596, 207 N.W.2d 297, 310 (1973). Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 271, 104 N.W.
12, 16 (1905). Scholoendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E.
92, 93 (1914).
87. The Quinlan court stressed that "termination of treatment" should not re-
quire prior judicial determination. 70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
88. 379 So. 2d at 360.
89. N. Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Pa-
tients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1977). G. Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L.
REV. 999 (1967).
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active euthanasia would obviously require a revision of current criminal
law.90
There is also concern that these acts will create more problems
than they solve by inhibiting other lawful withdrawal of life-supporting
treatment, unless such a document has been executed by the patient.
Another concern is that physicians' diagnoses can be fallible and pa-
tients can experience spontaneous remissions. 91 Nonetheless, these con-
cerns have been addressed in the statutes and safeguards have been
instituted to decrease their occurrence."
Since the Quinlan case, nearly all state legislatures have been
presented with natural death bills. The first living will statute was en-
acted in California in 1976, 93 followed by seven others in 1977" and
two in 1979. 95
Our case has come before the Florida judiciary since the legisla-
ture has not acted. For the past decade, it has rejected death with dig-
nity legislation.96 As a result the Florida courts must take the lead in
establishing the law in this area. Legislative inaction must not prevent
judical enforcement of constitutional rights.97
The three latest cases9s in this area promote the need for judicial
recognition of the living will. In In re Spring," the court emphasized
90. N. Cantor, supra note 89; G. Fletcher, supra note 89.
91. Ironically, Karen Quinlan is still alive in a nursing home three years after
her respirator was disconnected.
92. KAN. STAT. §§ 61-28, 102-28, 103 (Supp. 1979).
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1980).
94. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-301-3804 (Supp. 1977). IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501-
4508 (Supp. 1980). NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540-.690 (1977). N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
24-7-1 to -11 (1978). N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (Supp. 1979). OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1977). TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp.
1980).
95. KAN. STAT. § 65-28, 101 & 65-28, 109 (Supp. 1979). Ch. 112, 1979 WASH.
LAWS (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 70).
96. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
97. As the Perlmutter court stated: "Preference for legislative treatment cannot
shackle the courts when legally protected interests are at stake .... Legislative inac-
tion cannot serve to close the doors of the courtrooms of this state to its citizens who
assert cognizable constitutional rights."
98. In re Spring, - Mass. .._, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980). Eichner v. Dillon, -
A.D.2d ._, 424 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980). In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973).
99. - Mass. at , 405 N.E.2d at 115.
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that the "living will" responds to the wishes of patients who have
chronic disease which would be fatal if not for modern medical
technology.
The court in In re Yetter 00 enforced an oral expression of an in-
competent patient made while she was competent, requesting that she
not be treated for terminal illness. The court determined that if she
were competent at this moment, she would want the life-supporting
treatment terminated.
In Eichner v. Dillon,"1 Brother Joseph Fox, an 83-year-old incom-
petent patient, had expressed his wish for a natural death prior to be-
coming incompetent. The Supreme Court cited this expression as evi-
dence in a decision upholding the lower court's order to terminate
respiratory treatment. Unfortunately, Brother Joseph lapsed into a veg-
etative state after suffering a cardiac arrest and died of congestive
heart failure before the opinion was handed down. Brother Joseph had
expressed his wishes to Father Eichner and Father Keenan just prior to
hospitalization, stating that if he should enter into a state where his
brain was rendered permanently incapable of sapient and rational
thought, the use of extraordinary life support systems should be discon-
tinued and nature allowed to take its course.
Recognizing these previously expressed oral directives can create
tremendous hearsay problems. By adopting such a practice the court
would be forced to play a guessing game as to the patient's wishes if
competent.
Although living will legislation is a good idea, it has produced dif-
ficulties which will undoubtedly be ironed out in time. The North Caro-
lina statute states that once a patient has been declared dead, consent
of the family is required to stop treatment.0 2 The Arkansas statute
provides for a list of relatives who can execute a living will for an in-
competent patient. 103 One can envision an unknown relative being em-
powered with the right to make this rather delicate decision. The Cali-
fornia statute requires the physician to determine the validity of the
living will, a cumbersome and unfair burden to the physician.1 04 In
100. 62 Pa. D. & C.2d at 620.
101. - A.D.2d at -, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 519 (1980).
102. See statutes cited in note 94 supra.
103. Id.
104. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1980).
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 6
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss3/6
5:1981 In re Living Will 469 1
Kansas, the physician can presume that the consent is valid if he has no
knowledge to the contrary.10 5 These matters could be solved through
the creation of one uniform living will to be copied in all states, provid-
ing for flexibility in the addition of clauses such as the individual's de-
sire to donate organs for medical research.
Many feel that informed consent to refuse treatment cannot be
given years before the patient confronts any terminal illness, when the
patient is in perfect health. However, wills to dispense of estates are
made years before death. Perhaps to compensate for changes in cir-
cumstances or feelings of the patient, we should provide for a codicil,
much like that for a will. Some states recommend that the living will
be reexecuted every set number of years to demonstrate that the pa-
tient's intentions have not changed.1 06
On the other hand, proponents of these advance declarations feel
that with the mental and physical duress of a terminal illness, the con-
sent may not be rational. While a contemporaneous declaration may be
the logical preference as in Perlmutter, the patient must be allowed to
exercise his constitutional right to refuse treatment in advance by writ-
ten directive, as he may never have the opportunity after falling ill.
SOLUTION: THE LIVING WILL
This court did not have to speculate as to our patient's wishes,
since they were enumerated in his living will. As our patient commands
a constitutional right to refuse treatment, his living will, in efffect,
merely establishes in advance those wishes which he could have ef-
fected legally under Perlmutter, at the discovery of his terminal illness,
were he conscious and capable of expressing his wishes. The living will
is destined to be a meaningful and legally recognized manner of provid-
ing for future events that directly affect one's right to privacy. Despite
a decade of failure by the Florida Legislature to enact any natural
105. KAN. STAT. § 65-28, 101 & 65-28, 109 (Supp. 1979).
106. Those states are California, Idaho and Oregon. See notes 93 & 94 supra.
25
Havens: In re Living Will
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
470 Nova Law Journal 5:1981 1
death legislation, courts should find the living will legally valid as the
first step toward inducing such legislation.
Sheryl L. Havens
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